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NO LEGO, YES LOGO:
The Federal Court of Appeal Protects Innovation in
Kirkbi AG and Lego Canada Inc. v. Ritvik Holdings Inc.
By Sean Robertson†
It has been well said that the most successful form of copying is to employ enough points of similarity to confuse the
public with enough points of differences to confuse the
courts. 1

Court held that Lego was not entitled to receive trademark protection irrespective of the Lego indicia being
popularly distinctive of Lego as the source of the wares.
Following its earlier decision in Remington Rand, 5 the
Court affirmed that the doctrine of functionality serves
to delineate what is properly the subject of a trade-mark.
In Remington Rand, it was held that where a distinguishing guise primarily or essentially relates to the
wares themselves, that functionality will invalidate the
trade-mark. 6 In this case, the Lego indicia (except for the
inscribed ‘‘LEGO’’ name), were considered functional in
all respects and, therefore, could not be a distinguishing
guise in either the statutory or common-law sense of the
term.
The majority of the Court opined that Lego was
attempting to extend its monopoly beyond the bargain
struck with the public when it was granted a patent. 7
Permitting protection for the utilitarian features of Lego
blocks under the trade-marks regime would have set a
precedent for Lego and others to acquire a renewable
monopoly on their wares. Inevitably, this would act as a
disincentive for innovation and render it difficult for
competitors to enter the market. In disallowing the
passing-off action, the Court decided in favour of competition and innovation by ensuring that formerly protected patent knowledge flows to the public realm. 8 This
article will discuss the case at the trial and appellate
levels. It will specifically address the underlying policy
debate between the majority and the dissenting decisions at the Federal Court of Appeal. The author will
compare this debate to two similar international cases
involving Lego’s infamous intellectual property litigation.
With this recent finding in the 40-year-old saga of international case law surrounding Lego’s trade-mark
enforcement strategy, the Appeal Division of the Federal
Court of Canada joins the ranks of several other courts
that have similarly excluded protection for Lego based
on the doctrine of functionality. 9 The comment concludes with some suggestions as to the implications of
this decision in respect of its implicit endorsement of
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he name ‘‘Lego’’ is derived from two Danish words
that are the equivalent of ‘‘play well’’. 2 On July 14,
2003, the Appeal Division of the Federal Court of
Canada handed down its decision on this very matter in
Kirkbi AG and Lego Canada Inc. v. Ritvik Holdings Inc. 3
The case explored the potential for proprietary protection of wares beyond the expiration of a patent through
the commencement of passing-off actions under trademark law. Whereas a patent is a monopoly on technology for a limited period of time, a trade-mark is a
potentially perpetual monopoly on a mark that serves to
indicate the source of the product to the public. 4 A mark
may take the form of a name or a logo on the product or
its wrapping, as opposed to the subject matter of a
patent, which is the engineering or functional essence of
a product. Additionally, where a mark takes the form of
the shaping of the wares themselves or their wrapping, it
is referred to as a ‘‘distinguishing guise’’. The decisions
address the elusiveness of trade-mark protection for
unregistered and registered distinguishing guises that
relate primarily to the functionality of the wares.
Kirkbi AG and Lego Canada Inc., the appellants
(‘‘Lego’’), claimed that the configuration of the top of
their blocks — i.e., the arrangement of cylindrical studs
with the ‘‘LEGO’’ name inscribed on their tops (the
‘‘Lego indicia’’) — constituted a distinguishing guise.
Lego contended that Ritvik Holdings Inc. (‘‘Ritvik’’), the
defendant, had infringed upon its distinguishing guise by
the manufacture and sale of its Micro line of building
blocks, a plastic toy system very similar to Lego blocks.
Despite its functionality, Lego convinced the Court that
the Lego indicia had acquired a distinctiveness as to
source for the Canadian public, the hallmark of a trademark. However, in a 2-1 decision, the majority of the
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branding and marketing, especially in the context of
functional modular products, such as Lego. In seeking to
uphold competition by allowing others to use the utilitarian elements of expired patents, trade-mark law raises
the potential for competitors to ‘‘piggy-back’’ on the
goodwill of established competitors. This has created a
situation where branding and marketing have become
vital for incumbent manufacturers wishing to maintain
proprietary protection. As a result of Kirkbi, the makers
of functional modular products have limited prospects of
maintaining their monopoly rights through trade-mark
protection outside of adopting an aggressive branding
and packaging strategy, which could include a distinctive
ornamental dress on the ware itself or its packaging (i.e., a
distinguishing guise). We will briefly question whether
the innovation and competition imperative impelling
intellectual property policy is served by a regime that
endorses branding and its potential inefficiencies.

Decision at the Federal Court–Trial
Division
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irkbi AG et al. v. Ritvik Holdings Inc. involved Lego
launching a passing-off action against Ritvik, a
Canadian toy manufacturer. Lego did not try to defend
its proprietary interest in the Lego indicia through patent
law, since their patent expired in 1988. Instead, Lego
contended that Ritvik had used the Lego indicia in association with the promotion and marketing of its Micro
blocks. Lego alleged that the defendant had directed
public attention to its wares in such a way as to cause
confusion in the Canadian marketplace between its
wares and those of Lego, contrary to paragraph 7(b) of
the Trade-marks Act. 10
Gibson J. first queried whether the Lego indicia was
a valid trade-mark and, thus, capable of supporting an
action for passing-off under paragraph 7(b) of the Act.
The Court was presented with expert evidence on behalf
of Ritvik as to the functionality of each element of the
Lego indicia. Citing Remington Rand, Ritvik argued 11
that a distinguishing guise is invalid where ‘‘a mark goes
beyond the distinguishing of the ware of its owner to the
functional structure of the wares themselves’’. 12 Lego
countered by arguing that there is no mention of functionality in the definitions of either ‘‘trade-mark’’ or ‘‘distinguishing guise’’ in section 2 of the Act. It contended
that functionality only plays a role in the scheme of the
Act with respect to the registration and expungement of
registered trade-marks and distinguishing guises. 13 In his
decision, Gibson J. noted that the requirements of a statutory passing-off action in paragraph 7(b) do not evoke
either of the definitions of trade-mark or distinguishing
guise as defined in the Act. 14 Instead, he affirmed that the
common-law definition of distinguishing guise applies to
this section. He cited the decision of the Federal Court of
Appeal in Remington Rand, which held that a distinguishing guise that is essentially functional does not fall
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within the common-law definition of that term. 15 Lego’s
alleged distinguishing guise was found unable to support
an action for passing-off. In conclusion, Ritvik was held
not to have contravened paragraph 7(b) of the Act on the
basis that to whatever degree it had adopted the Lego
indicia, it had not infringed upon a mark that was indicative as to source.
In the alternative, Gibson J. questioned whether
Ritvik had acted contrary to paragraph 7(b) by directing
public attention to its Micro blocks by using the Lego
indicia in such a way as to cause confusion in Canada.
Gibson J. affirmed that paragraph 7(b) is the statutory
equivalent of the common-law action of passing-off. 16 He
reviewed the evidence against the elements for the
common-law test for passing-off: the existence of goodwill, deception of the public due to a misrepresentation,
and actual or potential damage to the plaintiff. In terms
of goodwill flowing from the use of the Lego indicia,
Gibson J. held that Lego’s goodwill — ‘‘in the sense of
benefit and advantage of the good name, reputation and
connection of its business’’ 17 — was derived to a certain
degree from the Lego indicia. 18 In respect of the deception of the public due to a misrepresentation, the Judge
canvassed survey evidence and held that Lego had discharged its onus of showing the likelihood of confusion
in the Canadian marketplace based upon its competitors’ uses of the Lego indicia. 19 However, he further held
that Lego had failed to show that the misrepresentation
flowing from Ritvik’s adoption of the Lego Indicia was a
deliberate strategy on the part of the defendant. 20
Instead, the Court opined that the confusion in the marketplace was a product of Lego’s promotion of a functional modular product in a way that did not clearly
distinguish a mark indicative of source from a mark
simply expressive of its engineering. This is to say that
Lego made few efforts in either the ornamentation of the
bricks or their wrapping towards the creation of a distinguishing guise or trade-mark as distinct from their preferred embodiment. This situation left little room for
competitors, such as Ritvik, to distinguish their own toy
blocks. Gibson J. concluded that confusion without the
intent to misrepresent did not amount to passing-off. 21
Thus, Lego’s action was dismissed.

The Kirkbi Decision, Federal Court
of Appeal

L

ego’s appeal from the decision of Gibson J. was
heard by the Federal Court of Appeal at Toronto.
The Court presented itself with two questions. First, it
inquired into its ability to intervene in the findings of
fact by the trial judge in respect of the functionality of
the Lego indicia. The Court held that the standard to be
applied when reviewing such decisions at the appellate
level is that of ‘‘palpable and overriding error’’. 22 After a
brief discussion of the utilitarian nature of Lego bricks,
the Court decided not to interfere with the finding of
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Gibson J. that the Lego indicia were functional. Second,
the Court addressed the question of the validity of trademarks that are primarily functional. It decided that this is
a question of law and, therefore, the standard to be
applied is one of ‘‘correctness’’. 23 Citing its decision in
Pizza Pizza Ltd. v. Canada (Registrar of Trade-Marks) 24
and Remington Rand, the majority of the Court held
that where functionality is merely peripheral to the
wares, then that is not sufficient to preclude trade-mark
protection. 25 However, based on the doctrine of functionality, the majority decided that the Lego indicia did
not satisfy the definition of ‘‘trade-mark’’ as found in the
Act and at common law, due to their primarily functional nature. 26 Thus, since Lego could not hold a trademark on its toy blocks, Ritvik’s adoption and use of the
Lego indicia had not contravened the provisions of the
Act. In short, a trade-mark that is primarily functional
cannot sustain an action for passing-off under paragraph 7(b) of the Act.
Lego’s action was founded upon two principal arguments. First, based on a plain language reading of the
Act, Lego argued against importing the doctrine of functionality as an interpretive tool. 27 Under the Unfair
Competition Act, 1932, the precursor to the Trade-marks
Act, functionality was expressly mentioned as a consideration in the assessment of distinctiveness. Lego argued
that since the Trade-marks Act does not mention functionality in the definitions of ‘‘trade-mark’’ or ‘‘distinguishing guise’’ in section 2, then functionality is not
relevant to the existence of a distinguishing guise trademark; it is only relevant to the issue of registrability. The
majority of the Court rejected these arguments, and held
that the provision from the Unfair Competition Act,
1932 on distinctiveness and functionality was never
meant to be determinative of the separate question of
validity. Instead, Sexton J.A., for the majority, held that
the common-law doctrine of functionality ‘‘arose as a
necessary part of trade-mark law as interpreted by the
courts over the last 60 years. Its purpose was to prevent
the obvious abuse of permitting a person to effectively
obtain perpetual patent protection by means of a trademark.’’ 28 The doctrine of functionality was held to define
the limits of trade-mark protection for registered trademarks under both Acts as well as for unregistered trademarks at common law. 29 Regardless of the omission by
the drafters of the Trade-marks Act in a provision for
distinctiveness, the Court held that the 60 years of judicial consideration of trade-mark validity through the
optic of the doctrine of functionality remained in force.
Second, and in the alternative, Lego asserted that
the unregistered status of its distinguishing guise meant
that the doctrine of functionality did not apply. 30 The
doctrine basically militates against the extension of
patent protection beyond the 20-year maximum period
through trade-mark protection. Lego argued that since,
by definition, unregistered trade-marks do not enjoy the
unqualified monopoly rights attaching to registered
trade-marks, the doctrine of functionality need not be
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applied to address its non-existent monopoly. 31 Whereas
a registered trade-mark grants the exclusive use of a mark
to a trade-mark holder, Lego argued that an unregistered
holder acquires only a qualified proprietary interest. It
argued that this interest is limited, as competitors may
market products based on the same utilitarian features
so long as other incidental or ornamental material is
added to the product so as to eliminate confusion in the
mind of the public as to source. In other words, since the
doctrine of functionality is intended to defend against
monopolies, and the qualified proprietary interest of
unregistered marks supports healthy oligopolies, the doctrine should not apply in the context of unregistered
trade-marks. 32 In the context of a registered trade-mark,
it was argued that the exclusive right to use means that
the addition of ornamental or other elements to a trademark by competitors is not enough to avoid a successful
claim of injunctive relief by the registered owner (as
opposed to the unregistered context, where such additions may be sufficient). 33 It follows, argued Lego, since
registration inhibits competition, that the protection
granted to a registered trade-mark should not include
functional aspects, as this would inevitably curtail innovation. By contrast, since the qualified right of an unregistered trade-mark supports competition, functionality
need not be a bar to the validity of a trade-mark. Lego
further contended that the objective of avoiding confusion as to source for the public would be thwarted by a
universal application of the doctrine of functionality. In
conclusion, Lego argued that primarily functional unregistered trade-marks are capable of sustaining an action
for passing-off under paragraph 7(b) of the Trade-marks
Act and that it was entitled to injunctive relief.
The Court noted that if the doctrine of functionality did not apply to unregistered trade-marks, then they
would become more lucrative than registered trademarks because holders of expiring patents could prolong
(or ‘‘evergreen’’) the protection of their intellectual property over the functionality of their wares by remaining or
becoming unregistered trade-mark holders. 34 In Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco Inc. 35, Mr. Justice Binnie described
the prohibition on evergreening as it applies to patents:
A patentee who can ‘‘evergreen’’ a single invention through
successive patents by the expedient of obvious or uninventive additions prolongs its monopoly beyond what the
public has agreed to pay. 36

The appellant sought to evergreen its intellectual property protection not through the addition of uninventive
features and the application for a patent, but by availing
itself of trade-mark law and arguing that the doctrine of
functionality did not act as a bar to unregistered trademarks. The respondent successfully argued that Lego was
attempting to evergreen its former patent on the wares
themselves through trade-mark law. 37 Although holders
of unregistered trade-marks would still face the difficulties of proving validity and the expense of defending
their title from infringement, a fate avoided by the prima
facie proof of validity granted by registration, the Court
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implied that the benefits of a perpetual monopoly would
more than compensate for these costs. 38 This form of
monopoly would grant unregistered trade-mark holders
a benefit that would exceed any available under registration. Such a result would usurp the reasoning behind the
trade-mark registry and lead to the uncertainty of ownership it was created to readdress.
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Thus, except for the imprinted ‘‘LEGO’’ script on
the top of each stud, which itself is a trade-mark, the
Lego indicia did not serve to distinguish the wares in the
sense contemplated by the category of a distinguishing
guise. The Court affirmed that the efficient design of the
top of the blocks was dictated by the demands of the
essence of the Lego blocks (e.g., ‘‘clutch power’’ and
‘‘playability’’) and could not have been designed with the
intention of distinguishing the source of the product. 39
This is analogous to the finding by the Court of
Exchequer in Imperial Tobacco Co. of Canada v. Canada
(Registrar of Trade-marks), 40 where it was held that the
cellophane wrapping and the red tear-strip of a cigarette
package wrapper could only have ever been designed
along the lines of utility, with a mind turned to repelling
moisture rather than formulating a distinguishing guise.
The case law reveals that while a trade-mark or a
distinguishing guise may have a functional component
(such as a bottle of lemon juice shaped like a lemon 41),
where the shape of the wares or their containers, or the
mode of packaging of the wares claimed for protection
primarily relates to the wares and is lacking in ornamentation, protection is properly granted in the form of a
patent or industrial design. Patent protection is usually
discussed in terms of a contract between the public and
the inventor; it is meant to provide a financial incentive
to inventors in the form of a monopoly of limited duration as remuneration for their advancing of the state of
the art. The expiration of the monopoly is vital for
encouraging experimentation and competition in the
market. Patent rights are, therefore, a means for the
market to provide incentive for a self-sustaining cycle of
invention, growth, and efficiency. If a patentee could
evergreen a monopoly — for instance, by pursuing
passing-off actions based on an essentially functional distinguishing guise — then society would witness a diminishing return from its intellectual property regime: there
would be little incentive to advance the state of the art
on the part of the patentee or others, and the price of
wares would remain inflated in the absence of the pressures of competition.
In terms of Lego’s argument about piggy-backing on
reputation and the confusion as to source which could
flow from the universal application of the doctrine of
functionality, the majority of the Court turned to the
legal definitions of trade-mark and patent protection.
Sexton J.A. stated that trade-mark protection is not the
legal vehicle to obtain protection for what is properly the
subject of a patent. As the majority disposed of the case
based on the doctrine of functionality, it did not directly
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address the issue of confusion, which figured so prominently in the dissenting reasons. 42 The majority’s focus
on functionality is a tacit endorsement of the proposition
that the bargain struck between the inventor and the
public with the granting of a patent must trump concerns for confusion as to source. In any event, market
forces would punish those with weak trade-marks. In
other words, competitive market forces and the
impending expiration of a patent should animate Lego
and other manufacturers to differentiate their wares
from their essential form or preferred embodiment.
The majority decision is an affirmation of the liberal
economic policy informing the bargain between the
public and inventors along two poles: the duration of a
patent and the benefits of trade-mark registration. The
doctrine of functionality is clearly stated as the legal
expression of this policy. In both common-law and statutory passing-off actions, the proprietary protection of
functional elements is limited to the life of a patent so as
to strike the balance between rewarding and encouraging technological innovation. Regardless of the
acquired distinctiveness as to source flowing from a
design — whether Lego blocks, the triple-head of a
Philips electric shaver, 43 or an ergonomic foam shoulder
rest for a violin 44 — when the patent on a design that is
expressive only of its engineering essence expires, the
doctrine of functionality places its guise beyond trademark protection. The effect of the affirmation of the
doctrine of functionality also serves to buttress the trademark registration regime. Since the doctrine was held to
apply equally to both registered and unregistered trademarks (and distinguishing guises), registration, and the
certainty of title it confers, was affirmed as the basis for
an efficient trade-mark regime. Thus, registered trademarks retain a critical advantage over unregistered
marks. In the end, the self-sustaining cycle of incentive,
growth, and efficiency of liberal intellectual property regulation is fostered in this decision by its delineation of
the duration of a patent and affirmation of the benefits
of trade-mark registration.

The Dissenting Opinion

P

elletier J.A., in dissent, argued that where numerous
players share the same functional design, competition dynamics will naturally force competitors to differentiate their wares, thus reducing confusion. Pelletier J.A.
proffered that the existence of a qualified proprietary
right to exclusive use for unregistered owners, and the
competition it engenders, was free from the risk of piggybacking on the goodwill of the incumbent producer
which would be produced by the majority’s decision. 45
The implication of Pelletier J.A.’s argument is that the
majority reasoning, out of a blind adherence to promoting competition, abdicates its public service role of
discouraging confusion as to source by allowing multiple
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competitors to piggy-back. By contrast, the position of
the majority is that the inventor has already been remunerated for the invention and, at the expiration of the
patent, the invention enters the public domain. This is to
say that to require emerging competitors to alter the
dress of a ware that is rightly the property of society is to
effectively grant incumbent inventors protection on the
essence of the design which they are no longer owed.
This would produce an uneven playing field in the
market. Indeed, Pelletier J.A.’s position presents difficulties in cases where the augmentation of the ware,
beyond its preferred embodiment in the interests of not
confusing the public, would require a scale of alterations
that would potentially render the competing ware less
efficient, elegant, and marketable. Thus, Pelletier J.A.’s
argument as to the existence of competition stemming
from unregistered trade-marks would not be tenable in
all cases, not the least of which would be functional
modular systems, where even modest changes to a
design could nullify compatibility and competitiveness.
The result would be the uneven application and predictability of trade-mark law; for some products, a change in
the colour would be enough so as to not confuse the
public, whereas for others, the degree of change required
would act as a bar to competition and a de facto
monopoly would emerge, condoned by trade-mark law.
Out of its overriding concern for clarity as to source,
Pelletier J.A.’s decision posits that the continued exploitation of the public by the holder of an expired patent is a
lesser evil than permitting piggy-backing on the good
will of another.

Functionality in Germany and Italy

I

n place of the objective test of functionality presented
by the majority, Pelletier J.A. presented a commercial
ethical argument that sought to avoid the confusion as to
source putatively promoted by the objective test. Instead
of focusing on the monopoly that Lego holds on interlocking toy block systems, this argument addresses the
unfair competition that results where competitors are
permitted to imitate a product and piggy-back on both
its development and goodwill. Decisions in some European courts have also tackled unfair competition within
a commercial ethical framework, but from a different
angle; with recourse to the distinction between functionality and necessity. 46
In the famous and controversial case, Klemmbaustein, 47 Lego successfully sought protection under the law
of unfair competition against the copying of its bricks
following the expiration of its patent. The German
Unfair Competition Act is drafted in broad language
which has allowed the German courts to decide unfair
competition issues with a degree of latitude commensurate with the evolving requirements of the business community. The German Bundesgerichtshof (‘‘BGH’’) held
that the sale of identical copies of Lego bricks by a
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competitor infringed Lego’s rights and amounted to
unfair competition. The BGH decided that although the
Lego indicia was functional, it could indeed be configured otherwise and, thus, was not necessary. This is to
say that since the configuration of the Lego indicia was
held not to be essential, the doctrine of functionality did
not apply. With this decision, competitors were free to
make their own functionally similar toy blocks, but they
were barred from making blocks identical to those of the
Lego system. In reaching its decision, the BGH held that
the Lego modular system was a single distinct market: if
competitors could make parts for Lego systems, this
would affect the sale of Lego. The BGH contrasted this
to the case of spare parts for automobiles; the manufacturing of cars and spare parts are considered two separate, but parallel, markets because the manufacturing of
spare parts does not impinge on the primary market of a
car manufacturer. Competitors are permitted to manufacture parts for cars that they do not produce because to
not allow them to do so would give car manufacturers a
monopoly in both their primary and subsidiary markets.
As Cuonzo and Pike note:
The BGH stated that the competitor was perfectly able to
produce its own set of interlocking bricks and there was
therefore no justification for encroaching on Lego’s hard
won market by making bricks identical to and compatible
with Lego’s. With this reasoning the BGH struck a balance
between on the one hand allowing competitors to enter the
market of toy building bricks and on the other allowing
Lego to protect its own set of bricks. 48

The substitution of an objective test for functionality
with a subjective test for unfair competition informs the
smaller portion of the international case law involving
Lego. 49
Despite the fact that Klemmbaustein was not mentioned, the Italian Supreme Court applied the same economic rationale 50 in the controversial case, Lego Systems. 51 In contrast to the broad discretion available to
the BGH, the Italian Supreme Court made its decision
under the narrower unfair competition provisions found
in Article 2598(1) of the Italian Civil Code and related
case law. Lego appealed the decisions of Milan’s District
and Appeal Courts, which held that Tyco and other
competitors were free to copy the functional aspects of
Lego blocks so long as its patents had expired. In overturning the decisions of the lower courts, the Supreme
Court held that although the Lego indicia were functional, they were not necessary; competitors were free to
produce functionally similar blocks (i.e., those with
‘‘clutch power’’) provided that the form of the blocks,
such as the arrangement of the cylindrical studs, was
different. The Italian Supreme Court sought to strike a
balance between protecting Lego’s investment and
research, and affording competitors the opportunity to
market functionally similar blocks.
Although the reasoning of these courts supports the
protection of functional modular systems, it becomes
problematic in instances where there is already a domi-
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nant manufacturer, because such protection actually
would serve to support a monopoly. The result would be
similar to one where a decision was motivated by concerns for piggy-backing and confusion, such as that proffered by Pelletier J.A. It may be argued that these commercial ethical arguments do not strike a balance
between rewarding an inventor and stimulating innovation and economic growth, but instead produces a lessening of competition. In the context of a modular ware
and a monopolistic market, such as in the case of Lego, it
is dubious whether other players can realistically compete without recourse to a level of imitation synonymous
with compatibility. 52

Conclusion
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irkbi AG and Lego Canada Inc. v. Ritvik Holdings
Inc. stands for the proposition that although a distinguishing guise may have a functional element, the
extent to which it relates primarily to the wares themselves — where the form or wrapping of a product is
really a result of its engineering and not its marketing —
it ceases to be a distinguishing guise and becomes a
matter more properly protected under patent law. This
decision leads to the conclusion that where the form
and, in this case, distinctiveness of a ware are purely
drawn from its functionality, as opposed to an ornamentation intended to mark the source of the product, there
are two possibilities open for those seeking monopolistic
proprietary rights. First, these rights could be pursued by
means of obtaining a patent. Second, where the first
alternative is unavailable or its expiration date is
approaching, (would-be) trade-mark holders could
undertake a range of strategies in the hopes of
engendering goodwill towards the ware before others are
able to exploit the patent. These strategies may include
adding non-functional material (or an ‘‘innocuous variation’’), adopting distinctive packaging, and pursuing an
aggressive branding scheme.
This case suggests that if one designs a product in an
efficient way, based on principles of functionality, then
one cannot expect to be able to extend a patent over the
product with a trade-mark based on that efficient design.
Furthermore, if one produces wares that are modular
(such as a system of interlocking blocks, or any other
wares designed in the preferred embodiment), then
there is even less of an opportunity for an extended
monopoly than if one produces wares that are less
refined or non-modular, because the latter can be more
readily the subject of a new patent for an innovation
and/or distinguishing guise. From the one perspective,
this decision seems to encourage inventors interested in
long-term monopoly rights to advance the state of the art
only so far as necessary to attract customers, but not so
far as to exhaust the prospects for future patents based

Notes:
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on uninventive ‘‘improvements’’. However, the policy
behind the decision would undoubtedly maintain that
the pressures of competition in the market would act as
a corrective to ensure that any gross complacency
towards invention would result in consequences to the
bottom line.
This case deals with functional modular designs.
Products that would fall into this category would include
not only Lego toy blocks, but also an array of products
whose ‘‘simple’’, efficient engineering and unadorned
aesthetic both flow from function, on the one hand, and
are a source of distinctiveness, on the other. Inventors of
such products are naturally disinclined to adopt guises
that would interfere with their engineering, as they have
already adopted the preferred embodiment. Nevertheless, this decision highlights that the interrelationship of
patent and trade-mark law necessitates branding and
marketing, as well as the adoption of an incidental element or ornament. An illustrative example of a company
that has faced these intellectual property challenges is
Interface, the world’s largest manufacturer of flooring. 53
This company chose fashionable colour combinations
and patterns in its design of an extensive line of functional modular floor tiles. It also adopted a stylized logo
based on the (functional) adhesive dots used to anchor
the tiles to the floor. Part of its branding has also
included its commitment to significantly reducing the
company’s environmental footprint. Along with its compelling catalogue marketing, Interface has marshaled its
putatively ‘‘ephemeral rights’’ 54 in 19.69 ⫻ 19.69 inch
tiles into not only consistently successful sales but also a
means of maintaining enforceable trade-mark protection.
Because of the opportunity for piggy-backing and
the affirmation of the duration of patents in the majority
decision, clever branding and marketing will only be
encouraged. In addition to manufacturers competing for
consumers based on reputation, quality, innovation, and
price, one may argue that the intellectual property
regime has ensured that branding and marketing forever
play a critical role. In other words, instead of the public
being free to reward producers for superior functional
modular products — the beauty and identity of which
flow from their function — the public is motivated to
reward them for something arguably external to both
the efficient advancement of the art or science and the
sustainability of the economy: their spin. 55 In the case of
Interface, we have seen this spin take an environmentally
sustainable form. It remains to be seen whether the selfsustaining cycle of innovation that intellectual property
law aims to uphold benefits in the many other instances
where the efforts of advertisers and marketing professionals, as opposed to designers, engineers, and environmentalists, are the first to be rewarded.
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